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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
F.\LCON.AERO
ENTERPRISE, .)
lNC.. a Utah Corporation, and
CHARLES VV. TAGGART,
Plaintiffs-Respondents~

f

i

vs.

No.
10173

.TOliN F. BO,VERS, et al,
Defendants~,·
IX'Tl2ll~IOUNTAIN
~IEN1.

DE.VELOPINC., a Corporation,
~!
Defendant-Appellant. /

REPLY BRIEF
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
PLAINTIFF FALCON AERO ENTERPRISE, INC., LACKED LEGAL CAPACITY
TO FILE SUIT, AND THE TRIAL COURT
ERRED IN NOT DIS:l\'IISSING THE ACTION.
'Vhether Falconaero's corporate existence continued after dissolution is determined by Section I 01,

3
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Chapter 28, Laws of Utah, 1961. Under this Section,
inasmuch as Respondent Falconaero distributed the
property to its sole stockholder, not during dissolution,
but prior thereto~ the corporation died upon the execution of the Certificate of Dissolution.
Respondent relies solely upon Section 100, Chapter
28, Laws of Utah 1961 to save it. But that section
applies only to corporations which have claims, rights
or liabilities incurred. The claim upon which Respondent
predicates its continued existence is a supposed cause
of action to quiet title. Why Respondent cited Boothe
v. Wyatt, 54 U. 550, 183 P. 323, is a complete mystery.
Neither the fact situation nor the law of the case is in
point. Respondent cites Hacienda Homes v. Peck, 113
P 2d 487, and Piland v. Craig, 154 P. 2d 583, to support
the position that where one has conveyed by warranty
deed, he still retains a claim upon which a quiet title
action may be predicated. These two cases are not in
point. In each one, the Plaintiff fee title holder had
placed a warranty deed in escrow, to be delivered upon
the completion of a contract by a purchaser. But the
deed in each case had not yet been delivered. Thus, the
Plaintiff grantor had not actually parted with title.
To support its position that a grantor by warranty
deed still had a claim upon which an action to quiet
title n1ay be brought, Respondent cites 97 A.L.R. 711.
This annotation divides the cases on this point into three
classes: One class upholds the position of Appellant
that no quiet title action Inay be brought by a warrantor

4
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aflcr coun.~yance, and .Appellant's citations in the
original brief support this view. A second class of cases
holds that a warrantor may file an action after parting
with title if the grantee retains part of the purchase
price pending dearing of title. But this requirement
docs not exist in the case at bar. The third class permits
a warrantor to sue to quiet title, having a sufficient
i11lcrest, because of his liability under the warranty.
These are poorly reasoned cases. But even this reason
l'or per1nitting suit by the warrantor does not exist here.
In the case at bar, Respondent Falconaero, the dissolYed corporation, had warranted to its sole stockholder
as a distribution to him of its assets. The stockholder
is entitled only to that which the dissolved corporation
had. Thus, any warranty is ineffectual. The stockholder
certainly has no need of, nor is he legally entitled to
sueh protection. Suppose he sued for breach of warnmty. l-Ie "-ould have to disgorge some of his distribution back to the corporation to pay his own judgment.
Thus, under neither Section 100 or Section 101,
Chapter 28, Laws of Utah 1961, is the corporate existence of Respondent Falconaero prolonged. Logic and
the law point to no other result. The trial court should
haYe held there was no capacity to sue and should have
dismissed the cause, and disposed of this case.
On page 3 of its brief. Respondent attempts to
mnke an issue of i-\ppellant's admission of Respondent's
corporate existence, and later denial of it by amendment
to the ~lnswer. E-ddently} Respondent is attempting to
)
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cover its embarrassment for the discovery of its nlisrepresentation in its complaint as to the corporate
existence and the ownership of the property at the time
suit was filed. The amendment was proper, if for no
other reason than that the pleadings might conforn1 to
the evidence as established at the trial.

POINT 2.
PLAINTIFF FALCON AERO ENTERPRISE, INC., WAS NOT THE REAL PARTY
IN INTEREST, AND THE TRIAL COURT
ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT.
Appellant has nothing to add to the argu1nent in
the original brief on this Point. Respondent-Falconaero
having distributed the property to its sole stockholder
prior to the filing of the within action, was not and is
not the real party in interest as required by Rule 17
( 2) , Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

POINT 3.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING TAGGART TO BE .JOINED AS A
P .A.RTY PLAINTIFF.
In attempting to support its claim that Taggart
was properly joined, Respondent cites the following
cases:
6
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.J uhnson , .. Continental Casualty Co., 78 U. 18,

aoo

Pae. lO:J:!. 'I'his case held that a bill of exceptions

was not filed in the time allowed. Nothing in the opinion
1·elatcd

to pertnitting a party to be joined where the

I ,laintitl' "·as not the real party in interest. \'Vhy this
case was

cited is a mystery.

Shay

Y.

Union Pacific Railroad Co., 47

L~.

252,

I.>a Pae. :n, pern1itted amendment to add a new
allegation. Evans v. IIoutz, 57 U. 216, 193 Pac. 858,
permitted an amendn1ent as to tender. The opinions in
these eases say nothing as to substitution of a party
plaintiff who was not the real party in interset, and for
that reason are not in point.
Plotkin Y. Merchants Bank & Trust Co., 125 SE
J41, held it was discretionary with the trial court whether
one who has conveyed propertywhile an action was pending n1ny continue to prosecute his suit or whether the
name of the grantee should be substituted. Again, this
case is not in point.
X ot one of the above cited cases upholds the position of Respondent-that there may be substitution of
a plaintiff in the stead of one who is not the real party
in interest at the commencement of the suit.

1t is 1nost interesting to observe that Respondent's
l'ibtion of 135 .A.. L.R. 325 (which supposedly supports
the proposition that amendment may be made to substitute the real party in interest as a plaintiff) at page
331 holds directly contrary to its position in stating:
7
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"It has been held that where an action is brought in the
name of a plaintiff who is dead or nonexistent, the complaint may not be amended by substituting a plaintiff
having capacity to sue." Numerous cases are cited by
A.L.R. to support this proposition, some of which cases
are cited in Appellant's original brief.
Respondent cites Kehrlein-Swinerton Construction
Co. v. Rapkin, 156 Pac. 972, and Norton v. Steinfeld,
288 Pac. 3, to support its position that an action by a
non-existent Plaintiff could be amended to insert the
name of a proper party. In these two cases, corporate
charters were suspended due to non-payment of fees
to the state, there being provisions for reinstatement of
corporate charters upon payment of fees and penalties. The court permitted the substitution of the officers
and directors as trustees. However, there is a vast difference between the suspension of corporate powers as in
these two cases, and the termination of corporate existence by voluntary dissolution as in the case at bar.
Thus, the two cited cases are not in point.
The other cases cited by Respondent are poorly
reasoned and appear to set forth a minority view of
the subject. They discuss whether or not amendment
is abuse of discretion, while the real point is whether
there is anything before the court to be amended, when
the plaintiff is non-existent.
Appellant relies upon the authorities cited in the
oriO'inal
brief.' and the conclusions therein stated: That
0
Respondent-Falconaero was non-existent at the time

8
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wilhill action was filed; therefore, the action was
a nullily and there was nothing before the court to
ameiHL The law and the facts here cannot be seriously
disputed.
till'

POINT 4.

TIIE COnlPL.A.INT DID NOT STATE il
l'L~\11\1

AS .AGAINST DEFENDANT-APPELLl~NT
UPON \VHICH RELIEF CAN BE
PREDICATED, AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN
DISl\llSSED.

Uespondents are laboring under the i1npression
that Appellant did not raise this issue below, and therefore cannot now raise it for the first time on appeal,
citing the cases of Dean v. Davis, 242 U.S. 438, and
Idaho State Bank v. Hooper Sugar Co., 74 U. 24, 276
Pac. 659.
There are two things wrong with this position. The
tirst is that Appellant DID raise the sufficiency of the
Complaint. The quotation from Appellant's First Defense. on Page 15 of the original brief filed herein, raises
the sufficiency of the Complaint.
The other thing wrong is that the cited cases relate
to an1biguities in the respective cOinplaints, which the
courts held could not be raised for the first time on
appeal. But here, we do not have an ambiguity in the
Complaint. The Complaint does not state a cause of
1
: .ction ..A.s t~ ,~he law on this point, please see 5 .A. rn.

9
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J ur. 2d, Appeal and Error, paragraphs 592 and 593,
pages 59 to 61. This annotation cites the Utah case
of Mayer v. Rankin, 91 U. 193,63 P 2d 611, 110 A.L.U.
837. The Utah case holds that the absence of an allegation vital to the cause of action is not a mere technical
omission, but is a fatal defect which can be raised on
appeal for the first time. The defect in the case at bar
is vital to the cause of action, and may be raised at anr
time.
Thus, on both these matters, the Respondents are
1n error.
As to the defect, a complete reading of paragraph
3 of the Complaint as quoted in Respondents' brief at
pages 10 and 11, shows clearly that while it is alleged
" ... ; that the defendants ... claim or may claim some
interest in and to said property ADVERSE to that
of the plaintiff," it is further alleged in the sa1ne paragraph" ... , but that said claimed interest of said defendant is invalid and IS INFERIOR to the rightj
title and interest of the plaintiff in and to said property
... " In other words, the admission in the latter part
of the allegation, that the right IS INFERIOR, in
effect repudiates the allegation that it is ADVERS1~.
Thus, by admitting Defendant's interest was inferiOl\ and praying that it be so declared, the Plaintiffs
are not entitled to a decree quieting title to the property.

10
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POINT 5.
l>El•'l~~D.A~T-APPELLANT'S FEE TITLE

iS \'OT DEFE£\.TED BY THE FOUR--YEAil
.\U\'EHSE POSSESSION . AND LIMITATION'
:~T.ATUTES HELA.TING TO TAX TITLES.
Hcspondents and their counsel are haYing diffil'ulty in understanding that in the case of the four-year
statute relatiug to tax titles, as in all other cases either
in law or in equity, the plaintiff has the burden and
must establish a prima facie case by his evidence.
Scdion 104-2-5.11, Chapter 19, Laws of Utah
l~}J1, in defining the term "tax title", sets forth the
required proof to establish a prima facie case. This
indudes proof that a tax was levied against the property, there was a tax sale for non-payment of taxes,
and, the rede1nption period having expired, that a final
sale was 1nade to the county. Then must follow evidence
that the property was relieved of the tax lien. These
are the requirements of the definition of a tax title as
cited aboYe. Counsel for Appellant affirms that such
(lefinition is the law~ in spite of protests from counsel
for Hespondents on page 13 of the answer brief. It was
enacted by the Legislature, signed by the Governor
and duly published. 'Vhy counsel for Respondents questions the assertion that "this is the law" is difficult to
understand, especially when he is relying on other pro,-isions of the smne enactment.
There is wisdmn in these requirements. After sucb
eYidence has been introduced, the fee title claimant 1s

11
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on the horns of a dile1nma: First, if he cannot show
irregularities to defeat the tax title, he loses his case.
Second, if he does show such irregularities, he then is
confronted with the effect of the four-year statute.
Appellant's position is that Respondents did not prove
a prima facie case to come within the purview of the
four-year statute.
The only evidence consisted of the auditor's tax
deed (Pre-Trial Exhibit 4) dated February 28, 1939,
issued by authority of Section 80-10-66, Utah Revised
Statutes 1933, and the deed from Salt Lake County to
Mr. Hancock (P. Exhibit 3) dated December 31, 1943,
executed pursuant to Title 80, Chapter 10, Section 68
( 8) , Utah Code Annotated 1943.
·vvhile it is true that Section 80-10-66, Utah Revised Statutes 1933 provided that an auditor's tax deed,
executed under its provisions, was "prima facie evidence
of the facts recited therein", it was repealed by Chapter
101, Laws of Utah 1939, which provided new procedures, a new form of tax deed, and new provisions as
to what shall be prima facie evidence. As to the effect
of such a repeal, the court in Bejger v. Zawadzki, 252
Mich. 14, 232 NW 746, at page 747 says: "A remedy
or rule of evidence, created by the Legislature in derogation of the comn1on law, creates no vested right to
that remedy, and can be taken away by repeal." Sutherland, Statutory Construction, 3rd Edition,
ol. 1,
Section 2032, states under the heading of Repeal of
Statutes prescribing remedies: "'Likewise, where a

'T
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partit·ular t'onn of procedure by express or in1plied

proYision is nutde tnandatory in the enforcement of an
existing right, it operates to abrogate previous ren1edie:)
whether those re1nedies are prescribed by another statute
PI' exist by conunon law." Thus, the repeal of Section
H0-10-()6, Utah Revised Statutes .1933, destroyed the
prinw facie effect of the auditor's tax deed. Consequently. the auditor's tax deed in this case is not now prima
facie evidence of anything.

Respondents state that the deed from Salt Lake
County to ~Ir. I-Iancock is prima facie evidence of all
the prior proceeding leading up to the execution of
sai<l deed, by virtue of Title 80, Chapter 10, Section
hH, Utah Code Annotated 1943. This is a gross misstatetnent of the law. Section 68 is divided into eight
subparagraphs. Subparagraph ( 5) pr~vides that an
auditor's tax deed conveying property sold to a purl'haser at the public sale at the conclusion of the statu.:.
tory redemption period is prima facie evidence of certain
matters. But the deed from the County to Mr. Hancock is no such deed. Subparagraph (7) provides that,
as to property not bid in at the said public sale, the
auditor's endorsement made on the tax sale record,
eonveying the fee simple title to the county, duly certified. is prima facie evidence of certain matters. Eut
nga1n. the deed to Mr. Hancock does not come within
these provisions. The deed to Mr. Hancock was executed
under subparagraph ( 8) . This counsel defies Respondcnts and their counsel to point out any provision in this
:ntuparnrJraph providing that any statement in such a

13
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deed is pri11ta facie evidence of any matter recited therein.
Appellant agrees with Respondents' cited Utah
cases which hold that a valid tax title does not have to
be established under the four-year statute. But no Utah
case has laid down the rule that a tax title claimant, relying upon the statute, is relieved from the responsibility
of proving a prima facie case.
Thus, Respondents, having not established a prima
facie case as defined by Section 104-2-5.11, Chapter lU,
Laws of Utah, 1951, cannot claim protection under the
four-year statute.

POINT 6.
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT'S FEE TITLE
IS NOT DEFEATED BY THE SEVEN-YEriR
ADVERSE POSSESSION AND LIMITATIOX
STATUTES.
In rebutting the arguments of Respondents' brief,
Appellant respectfully urges this Court to keep three
things in mind: First, that the claimed acts of adYersc
possession must be confined to the period of 1955 to
1961, inclusive, for that is the only period of time Juring
which the taxes were paid prior to delinquency. Please
see Bowen v. Olson, 2 U.2d 12, 268 P 2d 983, 985,
which holds that redemption after prelitninary sale does
not constitute the payment of taxes necessary to establish adverse possession. Second, that under the rule

14
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of Kurz v. llltune, 407 Ill. 383, 95 NE 2d 338, adverse

possession Hcannot be 1nade out by inference or in1pliration. but 1nust be established by evidence that is dear,
positive and unequivocal, all presumptions being in
t'a n ll' of the true owner."
Third, the use of the stables and the operation of
the chuck wagon restaurant on Redwood Road, threequarters of a n1ile east of subject property, and the
maintenance of the lake some distance to the south of
it. did not constitute acts of trespass as against the
subject property or the owner thereof. There being no
trespass, no cause of action arose, and no adverse possession or limitation statute commenced to run, ·whieh
could ripen into title. Thus, these acts cannot be considered in the case at bar.
Respondents, in their brief, rely upon three 1nain
proYisions of Section 78-12-9, U.C.A. 1953, as follows:
I. Land cultivated or improved.

This was Yaluable com1nercial and industrial property, which Respondent intended to use for commercial
purposes, and which sold for $2,000.00 per acre. In
the words of ~lr. Firmage, the son, it was actually used
as follows (Tr. page 16): "It was used for grazing purposes. It was used for about three years as a catch basin
for diYerting water from the lake that we were developing. and it was used for drainage ditches. It was alsowe did some leveling. ~Ir. Hancock tilled it before ·we
bought it from him."

·15
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First, no definite time was established for any of
said acts, except grazing, which appeared to have been
continuous. Appellant submits there was no clear, positive or unequivocal evidence the other acts occurred
during the period 1955 to 1961, when taxes were paid.
Thus, these acts cannot be considered. In addition, as
stated in Day v. Steele, 111 U. 481, 184 P 2d 216,
an act of leveling is insufficient to establish adYerse
possession, even though coupled with other acts of
casual use. Also, under Day v. Steele, and 3 Am. J ur.
2d, pages 93 and 94, the adverse acts must be commensurate with the nature, character, and locality of the
property, and to some purpose to which it is adapted.
These acts of using the property as a catch basin and
for drainage ditches not only failed to be appropriate
use of the property to ripen into title, but actually
were detrimental to subject property, and not inlprovements, whether the subject property be considered as
commercial and industrial in nature, or merely agricultural.
Also, Mr. Firmage, the son, admitted in his testimony (Tr. page 42) as follows:" ... and no, we didn't
till it. 1.\'Ir. Hancock tilled it and we pastured it." So,
neither did Respondents cultivate the land. 'Vith it
having been neither cultivated nor ilnproved, the clahne(l
adverse usage of the property could not ripen into title.
2. Protection by a substantial inclosure.

As to the claimed fencing, a careful reading of
Mr. Firmage's testimony (Tr. page 43, lines 22 to 2G)

16
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iudi<:aks there were some places where net wire fencing

some places where '"they" (apparently referring to smneone else) had barb wire fencing, and smne
places where there was neither. But that around the
entire area Respondent Falconaero put up the electrific.·d wire. According to this testimony, it appears the
horses got cut up in the other fencing, and the electric
wire kept them out of it.

ocl'lltTc<l.

~Ir.

Fir1nage was asked by his own counsel the
purpose of the fencing (Tr. page 56). His answer was,
''Just to keep the livestock in." This admission affinnnti,·cly establishes that Respondent never did intend
the electric wire to protect the property, and certainl~r
it failed to constitute a substantial inclosure .

.A.u inspection of the pictures ( P. Exhibits 7 to
:.?1) confirms the inadequacy of the claimed fencing.
P. Exhibits 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 16, 17 and 18, show only
an irregularly spaced line of posts, but absolutely no
wire of any kind, either electric, barb or net. The other
pictures show fragments of what appear to be barb
wire, running into the ground either in one or in both
directions.
By no stretch of the imagination can one conclude
that the oral testimony and pictures establish that Respondent Falconaero protected the claimed property
by a substantial inclosure. The electrified wire was
solely to keep the stock from straying and from getting
cut up in the barb wire. These ad1nissions, coupled with
the I'evelations of the photos, establish by affir1natiYe
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evidence the very opposite of Respondents' clai1n. There
was absolutely no substantial inclosure which protected
the property.
But this is not all. The subject property consisteJ or
several blocks in a platted subdivision known as Asbury
Park. The question naturally arises as to the legal effect
of inclosing an area which includes platted streets. Can
such an inclosure (flimsy in this particular case) ripen
into an adverse title by cutting off the owner's access~
This same question came up in regard to the use of a
public stream in the case of North Point Consolidated
Irrigation Co. v. Utah & Salt Lake Canal Co., 16 U.
246, 52 Pac. 168. This case held that where there was
a public right involved as well as a private one, adverse
usage by a claimant could not ripen into a lawful right
against the public, nor as against a private user. Here,
the platted streets are public property. Applying this
Utah case here, Respondent Falconaero, regardless of
the kind of fencing used, cannot get an adverse claim
either as against the public, nor as against a private
owner, the Appellant in this case.
3. Pasturage.

This valuable industrial and commercial property
was surrounded by such uses. It sold for a high price.
The income frmn pasturage ranged from $150.00 to
$400.00 per year, not just for the subject property of
20 acres, but for the entire 1000 acre tract ( 15 cents
to 40 cents an acre). As stated in Day v. Steele and i3
An1. J ur. 2d, supra, the nature, character, and locality
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of the property govern the use that an adverse clainlunt must nutke of it to perfect his title. The evidence
shows conclusively that subject property was not so
used by Respondents.

I-lowever, there is still another reason why pasturing this property could not ripen Respondents' clain1
into title. On pages 40 and 42 of the Transcript, .Nir.
Firmage adtnitted that it was tillable property, and
that :\lr. IIancock had so used it before they became his
successors. But they did not till it. This Court, in Adams
'"- Latnicq, ---· U. ____ 221 P 2d 1037, at page 1040,
said: ''The rule that title to property may be acquired
by adverse possession if it is grazed by an adverse claimant during the eqtire grazing season of each year is
limited to lands which because of their character are
reasonably suited for grazing purposes only and has
not been extended by the courts to land which can be
rultintted during the non-grazing months of the year."
Thus. even if we ignore the commercial and industrial
propensities of the subject property, under the rule
of this Court, the grazing of this property, which was
at least cultivatable by Respondents' own evidence,
could not cause Respondents' claim to ripen into title
under our statute.
It is uncontrovertible that Respondents have not
established their adverse claim by "clear, positive and
unequivocal evidence," or at all, under any one of three
bases relied upon in the their brief.
To rebut Respondents' claim on page 17 of its
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brief that Appellant is barred by the seven-year limitation statutes, we respectfully refer this Court to Seetion 78~12-7, U.C.A. 1953. This section provides that
the holder of the legal title is presumed to have been
possessed of the property within the time required b~·
law, and that the occupation of the property by an~·
other person is deemed have been in subordination to
the legal title, unless adverse possession has been established. Respondents have failed to establish adverse
possession. Appellant submits that it is entitled to the
above presumption.
POINT 7.
A DEED FROM AN HEIR CONVEYS
TITLE.
In a footnote to Respondents' Statement of Facts
(page 2 of the Answer brief), Respondents make a
misstatement of the law which needs correcting. The
statement is as follows: "Obviously, such a deed from
only one of the alleged heirs, without a probate proceeding or a determination of heirship proceedings to
show true heirship does not convey fee title."
Please see Chamberlain v. Larsen, 83 U. 420, 2!3
P 2d 355, wherein this Court said at page 357: " ...
Appellants urge that the cmnplaint did not state a cause
of action and that plaintiffs have not the capacity to
sue because there has been no adjudication of heirship;
that plaintiffs are not all the heirs of the decedent; ...
'Ve find no 1nerit in this contention. Upon the death
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uf lhe decedent, the title to any property of which she
died possessed inunediately passed to and vested in her
heirs, subject to administration and the payment of
debts. The purpose of an adjudication of heirship is
not to vest title but to adjudicate where the title of the
decedent has already vested. Regardless of whether
there had been an adjudication of heirship, the rights
of heirs can be asserted or defended in any proper manner." (Italics ours) .

CONCLUSION
If the decision of the lower court is permitted to
stand in this matter, we sincerely believe that some
well-established and fundamental principles of law relating to parties in interest and their substitution, to tax
titles, and to our statutes relating to adverse possession,
will be overturned or seriously clouded, which would
result in future uncertainty and consequential litigation. \Ve therefore respectfully submit that the lower
court's decision should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,

'VILLIAM D. CALLISTER,
Attorney for DefendantAppellant
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